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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
INCOME TAXATION-DEMAND NOTE AS DEDUCTIBLE
SALARY PAYMENT
The interpretation of the word 'paid' in the Internal Revenue
Code furnishes a fertile ground for dissenting opinions. In Anthony P.
Miller, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue," the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the Tax Court's construction of that word
by holding that demand promissory notes given by an accrual basis
corporation to its cash basis president were such payment of his salary
as to be outside the scope of the disallowance provisions of Section
24 (c) (1) of the Code.2
According to the Tax Court findings of fact, one A.P. Miller, a
construction engineer, had organized the taxpayer corporation and was
its controlling stockholder and president. He determined the salary he
was to receive for his services in 1940, which amounted to a $12,000
regular salary and a $30,000 bonus. On January 1, 1941 the corpora-
tion delivered two negotiable demand promissory notes to Miller cover-
ing the above amounts, and deducted the $42,000 in its 1940 income tax
return as an ordinary and necessary business expense. Section 23 (a)
(1) (A) of the Code 3 allows a corporation to deduct a reasonable al-
lowance for salaries, provided that such deduction is not disallowed by
section 24 (c). In applying the latter subsection, all three subpara-
graphs must apply to the taxpayer before the deduction is disallowed.
The Tax Court held that subparagraph (3) applied because the re-
lationship between Miller and his corporation was so close as to meet
1 164 F. )2d) 268, (C.C.A. 3, 1947). Petition for certiorari filed February 16,
1948.
2 Internal Revenue Code, Section 24 (c) : "Sec. 24. Items Not Deductible.
(c) UNPAID EXPENSES AND INTEREST PERIOD AFTER IN-
TEREST-In computing net income no deduction shall be allowed under
section 23(a), relating to expenses incurred, or under section 23 (b), relating
to interest accrued-(1) If such expenses or interest are not paid within the taxable year or
within two and one-half months after the close thereof; and
(2) If, by reason of the method of accounting of the person to whom the
payment is to be made, the amount thereof is not, unless paid, includible in
the gross income of such person for the taxable year in which or with which
the taxable year of the taxpayer ends; and
(3) If, at the close of the taxable year of the taxpayer or at any time
within two and one-half months thereafter, both the taxpayer and the person
to whom the payment is to be made are persons between whom losses would
be disallowed under section 24 (b)."
3 I.R.C., Section 23 (a) (1) (A) : "Section 23. Deductions From Gross Income.
In computing net income there shall be allowed deductions:
(a) EXPENSES.-
(1) Trade or Business Expenses.-
(A) In General.-AI1 the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or
incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, in-
cluding a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for per-
sonal services actually rendered;***"
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the requirements of section 24 (b) (1) (B) 4 ; that subparagraph (2)
applied because the notes were delivered in 1941 and nothing in the
record indicated that the money was unconditionally made available to
him in 1940 (taxpayer's taxable year) so as to justify the application
of constructive receipt to him as a cash basis creditor (the fact that
Miller himself did actually erroneously include the $42,000 in his 1940
return was immaterial, since what he had a right to do and not what he
did do governs in interpreting this paragraph); that paragraph 1 ap-
plied because the delivery of promissory notes did not constitute pay-
ment, especially as the notes themselves were not discharged until
December 31, 1942, practically two years after delivery. The Court
held in a ten to six decision that the reasonable allowance of $25,000
for Miller's salary-the entire $42,000 having been found unreasonably
high for an executive in a position comparable to Miller's-was not
properly deductible by the corporation in its 1940 return. The majority
reasoned thus:
"The word 'paid' as used in this section (24 (c) (1) ) means
paid in actuality in cash or its equivalent,, and the giving of one's
own note for one's obligation is not such payment. Giving a note
is not the equivalent of payment in cash, nor is it constructive
payment. The word 'paid' has an accepted and customary mean-
ing of paid in cash or its equivalent." 5
Cases cited in support of the decision were Helvering v. Price,"
Cleaver v. Commissioner,7 and Eckert v. Burnet," and the Tax Court
SI.R.C., Section 24 (b) (1) (B): "Section 24. Items Not Deductible.(b) LOSSES FROM SALES OR EXCHANGES OF PROPERTY.-
(1) Losses Disallowed.-In computing net income no deduction shall in
any case be allowed in respect of losses from sales or exchanges of property,
directly or indirectly-
(B) Except in the case of distributions in liquidation, between an
individual and a corporation more than 50 per centum in value of the out-
standing stock of which is owned, directly or indirectly, by or for such
individual."
5 7 T.C. 729 (1946).6309 U.S. 409, 60 S. Ct. 763, 84 L. Ed. 836 (1940). Here the taxpayer had
given his promissory note as guarantor of bank assets involved in a bank
merger, as payment under his guarantor liability, and sought to deduct the
amount of the note as a loss sustained in 1932, the year the note was delivered,
although the note was not paid in 1932. The Court held that the giving of a
note does not constitute a payment in cash or its equivalent so as to entitle
the taxpayer to a deduction as for a loss in making an income tax return
on the cash basis.
7 6 T.C. 452, (1946); affirmed 158 F. (2d) 342, (C.C.A. 7, 1946); cert. den.,
330 U.S. 849, (1947). Here a cash basis taxpayer claimed a deduction for
payment of interest, where a bank advanced him the balance of the amount
of a note he gave to the bank less the interest discounted in advance, con-
tending that he paid the interest withheld by the delivery of the note. The
face of the note was not to be paid until five years in the future, and the
appellate court held that no actual cash payment of interest had been made
in the .year the deduction was claimed, the note not sufficing.
283 U.S. 140, 51 S. Ct. 373, 75 L. Ed. 911, (1931). Here it was held that one
making his income tax return on the cash basis who has given his own note
in exchange for worthless notes on which he was indorser could not deduct
1948]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
further saw no necessity for extending the usual and accepted meaning
of the word 'paid' to include 'constructively paid' when such "unnatural
construction would breed confusion and administrative difficulties and
be subversive of the apparent purposes of the statute."
The majority opinion stressed legislative history:
"Section 24(c) was first enacted in the Revenue Act of 1937.
The principal purpose of adding this section is evident from its
legislative history. Deductions were being taken by certain
classes of debtors using the accrual method of accounting. These
debtors took the deductions in the year of accrual. The amount
of the deduction would not be includible in the cash basis credi-
tor's income until actually received. When the creditor bore a
certain relationship to the debtor, control and abusive manipu-
lation of the time of receipt, if ever, by such creditor was pos-
sible and frequently exercised. Thus, the Government was in a
position of permitting deductions to debtors for accrued items
on which income tax was avoided altogether by the cash creditor
or postponed to a taxable year selected by the creditor as being
most advantageous to him taxwise." 9
The six dissenting Tax Court judges thought that the notes, being
demand negotiable notes with a readily realizable value of par were
sufficient to render the salary 'paid' within the meaning of section 24
(c) (1).
On appeal, the Third Circuit, speaking through Judge Goodrich,
agreed with the dissenting judges of the Tax Court:
"The legal rule is well recognized that the giving and accep-
tance of the negotiable instrument is conditional payment of the
debt, and the creditor cannot proceed against the debtor on the
original obligation until the instrument is either surrendered or
dishonored. If the parties agree, the acceptance of the nego-
tiable paper will discharge the original debt altogether. In either
event, the creditor with the negotiable instrument in his hands is
in a much better position than a creditor without one."
from the gross income of the year in which he so gave his own note the
amount thereof as a debt 'ascertained to be worthless and charged off within
the taxable year,' the loss in such case not being sustained until his own
note is paid. Said Mr. Justice Holmes: "The petitioner says that it was
definitely ascertained in 1925 that the petitioner would sustain the loss in
question. So it was if the petitioner ultimately pays his note."
9 It was thought that section 24 (c) "should serve to stimulate reasonably
prompt payment of such accrued expenses in order that the debtor may
secure the allowance of the deductions. No hardship should result from the
requirement that the amount be paid within 2Y months after the close of
the year of accrual since expenses of this nature usually should be paid
within that time in the ordinary course of business while this restriction
would be applicable only to individuals and corporations in relationships
covered by section 24 (a) (6)-(now 24 (b) (1) (B))-, this class repre-
sents the worst offenders in the use of this loophole." Report of Joint Com-
inittee on Tax Evasion and Avoidance, House Document 337, 75th Congress,
1st Sess., p. 16.
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"Furthermore, as a matter of common parlance, we think it
is most common to speak of 'paying' an obligation by giving
one's check for it. That is the common method of paying bills
in this country. The use of the demand negotiable note is not
so frequent, but the two initruments have much in common,
nevertheless. Each is payable at once. Each rests on the credit
of the maker or drawer, respectively, for the bank is under no
obligation to the holder to pay a check. Nor is the drawing of
the check an assignment of the debtor's account with the bank."
"We think, therefore, that the taxpayer corporation paid its
president's salary when, on January 1, 1941, it gave him nego-
tiable demand promissory notes for the amount. Nor does this
conclusion violate the spirit of the Act as found in its legislative
history. Our brethren in the Sixth Circuit decision, already re-
ferred to,-' discussed this point in some detail, and reference is
made to the opinion in that case for its consideration."
The writer feels that the reasoning of the Tax Court majority is
more persuasive, because the reality of a promissory note, even though
negotiable and payable on demand, is that it is a promise to pay in the
future, being given by its maker to postpone payment; and even though
a demand note technically matures on delivery, in the normal situation
both maker and payee contemplate that such demand will not be made
immediately, but that discharge by actual cash payment will take place
some reasonable future time after delivery. In the present case where
the taxpayer and the corporation were so closely identified, it seems
that the notes were merely more permanent evidence of the debt. A
taxpayer in a situation such as this might never negotiate the notes, but
would rather defer demand for payment until the corporation could
comfortably pay. If the corporation became insolvent while the note
was outstanding, the creditor could claim a refund on his own income
tax, while the Government would have allowed a deduction for an ex-
pense that was never actually paid." Even if Miller had negotiated
'
0 Musselnan Hub-Brake Co. v. C.I.R., 139 F. (2) 69 (C.C.A. 6, 1943). Here
the corporation also gave its controlling stockholder demand promissory notes
within the 2/ month period, and the court held such notes such payment as
to entitle the corporation to take the deduction. The court said: "There was
no tax evasion in fact, and the evil sought to be remedied is not present.
Clearly under the rule of constructive payment, the notes with a readily
realizable value, of par were more than a mere accrual of indebtedness on
the books of petitioner." In the Miller case, the Tax Court fretted under
this reversal and remarked that the Sixth Circuit was confusing constructive
payment with constructive receipt, because in the asymmetrical revenue
statutes the one is not the corollary of the other, each fiction being erected
by the courts for independent reasons to frustrate multiform evasion schemes;
and even if there were constructive payment here, what warrant is there
for so extending the meaning of the word 'paid'?
"Compare Schlemmer v. U.S., 94 F. (2d) 77, (C.C.A. 2, 1938), where the
taxpayer claimed and received a refund on his income tax because he had
included as income a note given him by the corporation he headed for his
1927 salary, the corporation becoming insolvent. The note was never paid.
Judge Learned Hand commented: "It (the note) did not change the sub-
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the note within the 2Y month period, would he actually have been paid
his salary in the event that the maker failed to pay and his indorsee held
him liable on his indorsement? In the analogy which the Circuit Court
drew between a demand note and a check, it recognized that payment
by either could be conditional, and not absolute. In the statute being
construed, Congress simply used the word 'paid' without any such qual-
ifying adverbs as 'constructively' or 'conditionally'. Furthermore the
Tax Court decision seems more in line with the long standing policy to
construe strictly statutes permitting deductions."2 If deductions are
privileges and must be narrowly construed,"8 it seems to the writer that
a statute specifically aimed at disallowing a deduction should, a fortiori,
be strictly construed also, without judicial addition of qualifying words.
In cases involving the right of a cash basis taxpayer to take a de-
duction where he has undertaken payment of an expense by note ac-
tually discharged in a later year, the courts have denied such deduction,
in the year of delivery, the language used by Chief Justice Hughes in
Helvering v. Price'4 being typical:
"We think that this (Eckert) decision" is controlling here.
As the return was on the cash basis, there could be no deduction
in the year 1932, unless the substitution of taxpayer's note in
that year constituted a payment in cash or its equivalent. There
was no cash payment, and under the doctrine of the Eckert case,
the giving of the taxpayer's own note was not the equivalent of
cash to entitle the taxpayer to the deduction. Taxpayer urges
that his not was secured, but the collateral was not payment. It
was given to secure taxpayer's promise to pay, and if that prom-
ise to pay was not sufficient to warrant the deduction until the
promise was made good by actual payment, the giving of security
for performance did not transform the promise into the payment
required to constitute a deductible loss in the taxable year."
It is submitted that the Congressional intent in drafting section 24
(c) was to change the accounting basis of an accrual basis corporation
when paying the salary of a controlling officer, that is, to put it on the
cash basis for this limited purpose, and therefore the principles of cash
stance of the debt.*** and although it was more readily disposable, that
single incident was scarcely enough.*** Indeed, it is not at all clear that it
would have been a cash item, even if it had in fact been taken as payment."
It was held that the taxpayer was entitled to his refund, as the note was not
payment.
12 Deputy v. DuhPont, 308 U.S. 488, 60 S. Ct. 363, 84 L. Ed. 416, (1939) ; U.S. v.
Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, (1940), where the Court said: "Those who seek an
exemption from a tax must rest it on more than a doubt or ambiguity"; and
White v. U.S. 305 U.S. 281, (1938); "A taxpayer seeking a deduction must
be able to point to an applicable statute and show that he comes within its
terms."
13 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, Vol. 1, Section 3.08, (1942).
14 See note 6, supra, for facts.
25 See note 8, supra.
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basis accounting should apply.-6 One of the root principles of the cash
basis is that a deductible expense is not sustained until actually paid in
cash or its equivalent, and a promise to pay which may never be paid
ultimately will not suffice. In any event, the Third Circuit's interpreta-
tion of the word 'paid' should be confined to section 24 (c) (1), and
not extended to other sections of the Code in which the word appears,
as for instance section 23 (b) relating to payment of interest, or else
the confusion and conflict of authority predicted by the United States
Supreme Court in the Dobson case 7 will, as it appears to the writer,
be enhanced.
JoHN A. UDovc
'Hart v. Com=issioner, 54 F. (2d) 848 (C.C.A. 1, 1932), where a cash basis
taxpayer attempted to pay an interest debt by means of a promissory note,
the parties considering the debt discharged by the delivery of the note. The
court said: "A promise to pay is not cash, and a deduction for interest is
permissible only in the taxable year in which the taxpayer pays cash." In
Quinn v. C.I.R., 111 F. (2d) 372, (C.C.A. 5, 1940), the taxpayer on a cash
basis was not allowed to deduct, as a business expense, the amount of an
obligation to an accounting firm which was discharged by borrowing money
on taxpayer's secured note, the note not being paid during the taxable year.
-
7 Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 64 S. Ct. 239, 88 L. Ed. 248, (1943).
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